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Table 1: Legal tender coins in the five West African administrations, 1912
Administration Legal tender without limit Limited legal tender
British gold Foreign gold Foreign silver British Local Foreign
1. Sierra Leone and
2. Gambia
All gold and silver 
coins legally current 
in the UK
Certain French, 
Spanish and American 
gold coins
5-franc pieces of 
the Latin Union
All bronze coins 
legally current in the 
UK
nil nil
3. Gold Coast and 
Dependencies
ditto nil nil ditto Nickel-bronze 1/10 of a 
penny, half-penny and 
1-penny pieces
nil
4. Southern Nigeria 
(Western Province)
ditto Certain French, 
spanish and american 
gold coins
nil ditto ditto nil
5. Northern Nigeria 
and Southern Nigeria 
(Eastern and Central 
Provinces)
ditto nil nil ditto ditto nil
Source: NA: CO 984/2, WACC Report, ‘Statement of the coins which are now legal tender in the five West African administrations’, 2
Introduction
This paper explores the validity of the arguments articulated 
by the British colonial administration and business interests in 
favour of the institution of a colonial common currency system 
in British West Africa in 1912 (see Fig. 1). It also aims to provide 
an analysis of the extent to which the native populations 
accepted or challenged the new colonial monetary order. Given 
its centrality to Britain’s colonial project in West Africa, the 
Gold Coast (which was renamed Ghana in 1957 after gaining 
independence) will be used as a case study (see Fig. 2). The 
chapter explores how the loss of politico-monetary sovereignty 
in the Gold Coast was occasioned by the coming of colonialism, 
and the establishment of a colonial monetary system in the 
form of the West African Currency Board (WACB). The WACB 
managed the production and design of a common currency for 
the British possessions in West Africa, namely, The Gambia, 
Sierra Leone, The Gold Coast, Northern and Southern Nigeria 
(see Fig. 1).1 However, the Board faced numerous challenges in 
maintaining its monetary monopoly on West Africa before and 
after the First World War. Analysing the history of the WACB is 
significant because it provides insights into the manner in 
which early 20th century British colonial policy was formulated 
in London and executed in the colonies. As A.G. Hopkins 
attests:
There was an imperial monetary policy… and the solution 
propounded with respect to West Africa was fully consistent with 
that policy.2
This examination also enables us to gauge the effectiveness of 
the African responses to monetary colonization. 
The introduction of colonial coinage to West Africa
Before the formal introduction of colonial coins and paper 
money in British West Africa in the first quarter of the 20th 
century, Africans had their own currencies. African societies 
and kingdoms used monies such as cowry shells, gold nuggets 
and dust, iron rods, manillas and cloth currency. In the Gold 
Coast as well as the other British territories in West Africa, the 
indigenous currencies and United Kingdom silver coinage were 
largely replaced by the West African Currency Board 
currencies (see Table I), which were issued after 1912 when the 
WACB was established. This colonial currency became the sole 
legal tender for British West Africa in 1912 and was to cover a 
total area of 451,000 square miles (116,808,464ha) and a 
combined population of over 18 million people.3
Eric Helleiner argues that during the age of imperialism, 
currency boards were created by European powers in their 
respective colonies for economic ends, including the reduction 
of international and intra-colony transaction costs, and to 
promote imperial political identities.4 The creation of the West 
African Currency Board confirms his argument. Its 
establishment was due to the recommendations of the Report 
of the West African Currency Committee (WACC), a body 
commissioned by the Rt. Hon. Lewis Harcourt, M.P., Secretary 
of State for the Colonies. The mandate of the Committee was:
To inquire and report as to the desirability of introducing into West 
Africa a special silver coinage common to the five British West 
African administrations, and also as to the desirability of 
establishing a joint issue of currency notes in the same territories, 
and to advise upon the measures necessary for the regulation of 
the special coinage if introduced or for the better regulation of the 
existing currency in the event of a special coinage not being 
adopted.5
While economic considerations were central to the 
establishment of the Board in West Africa, it also had political 
ramifications for the local populations. It deprived Africans of 
the ability to develop and control an indigenous monetary 
system that would give their leaders greater political autonomy 
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Figure 2 The Gold Coast and Dependencies. Source: Wrangham 1999
Fuller
from the colonial administration. Prior to the publication of the 
Report, the WACC consulted with 22 of what the Report termed 
‘witnesses’, including the five colonial governments and 
business interests, such as the major banking and maritime 
establishments operating in British West Africa.6 None of the 
people consulted regarding the new currency system were 
African however.7 What does this exclusion of indigenous 
economic and political interests tell us about the aims of the 
incoming monetary regime? It appears that the British colonial 
authority was not aiming to empower Africans to take the 
reigns of a modern economic and monetary system as top-level 
administrators. Rather, it is evident that the aim was to replace 
an existing, albeit less modern economic system across the 
colonies, with a modern British system. It also appears that 
Africans were not thought to be capable of, or desired to be, 
active stakeholders in the ensuing monetary order. This 
evaluation on the part of the colonial and business officials, 
that Africans lacked the experience to participate in the new 
system, as we shall see below, was not completely accurate or 
justified.
Factors for change
Before 1912, colonial officials and their business counterparts 
contended that the most widely-circulating medium of 
exchange in British West Africa was United Kingdom silver 
coinage. Moreover, a variety of legal tender foreign currencies 
were also in circulation in the region at the time the WACC 
Report was published, as Table 1 shows. At the same time 
barter trade and traditional African currencies constituted the 
major aspect of trade in many rural areas.8 For example, in the 
Gold Coast Colony, while coin transactions dominated the 
urban areas, cowry shells enjoyed widespread usage mainly in 
more remote areas. Gold dust, the Akan all-purpose money, 
was also used as currency for larger transactions in rural 
parts.9 The presumed negative situation in the Colony of 
Ashanti and the Protectorate of the Northern Territories (see 
Fig. 2) also contributed to the complexity and urgency of 
implementing a new colonial currency order. Overall, the 
WACC found that the Gold Coast and Dependencies were:
In a backward state as regards the employment of metallic 
currency. In Ashanti, however, the use of British silver is stated to 
be making rapid progress, and gold is said to be considerably in 
demand by cattle traders in Coomassie [Kumasi], mainly for the 
purpose of trade with French territory. In the Northern Territories 
the natives still employ cowries for the small transactions of the 
market, but silver is gradually coming into use, and five-franc 
pieces are in demand by traders from French territory, and stand at 
a premium in relation to British money.10 
The characterization of metallic money in the British 
territories as being in a ‘backward state’ was not an entirely 
accurate assessment of the monetary reality in British West 
Africa. This is evident if we take the case of an important 
Dependency of the Gold Coast Colony, namely, Asante. The 
success of the British forces in the Yaa Asantewaa War of 
1900-01 resulted in the political annexation of Asante and its 
incorporation into the Gold Coast Colony. While the use of 
British metallic money was not common there at the time, 
Asante metallic currency, namely gold dust, was the currency 
of choice for official and commercial trade and transactions. 
Furthermore, gold dust currency was not only important in 
cattle trading with French territories, but in a variety of 
commercial transactions beyond the confines of British 
authority. T.C. McCaskie, in his two-part article, 
‘Accumulation, wealth and belief in Asante history’, reveals the 
extent to which the Asante state and its commercial sector was 
economically developed with regard to money and trade. In the 
late 19th century, the Asante state had a fiscally functioning 
and effective system of accountancy, taxation and even a 
‘national’ treasury. The latter was a kind of state bank called 
the ‘Great Chest of the Treasury’, which was located in the 
palace of the Asantehene in Kumasi, where gold dust (metallic 
money) was deposited.11 In the 20th century, moreover, 
successful Asante entrepreneurs and traders operating 
between Asante and the Gold Coast Colony used gold dust 
currency to trade in commodities including gold, rubber, cocoa 
and timber. They also provided services as moneylenders, gold 
dealers, investors, retailers, transportation suppliers and urban 
developers. Asante businessmen were also involved in the 
import-export trade.12 Therefore, for at least one major segment 
of the Gold Coast Colony and Dependencies, there was a 
complex economic and political system, with a central 
administrative authority, banking infrastructure and money 
that enabled trade to take place. However, McCaskie 
acknowledges that the advent of British ‘laissez-faire capitalism 
and the colonial cash economy’ ushered in a new economic 
regime that would eventually replace the local monetary 
order.13 
The need to eliminate the competing foreign and native 
currencies in Britain’s West African territories through 
monetization was also seen as being more crucial given the 
need to collect taxes. Helleiner explains: 
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a particularly important colonial objective was that of bringing 
peasants in colonial societies into a monetized economy as 
taxpayers, wage labourers in colonial enterprise, and producers of 
cash crops for export.14 
For example, by mandating that poll taxes be paid in the 
colonial currency, the state forced its subjects into the export-
oriented cash crop economy and other colonial ventures, where 
they were paid with said currency. This situation contributed 
to resistance and resentment of that system by colonial 
subjects.15 Secondly, British coins were imported into the 
colonies by two private banks, namely the African Banking 
Corporation (ABC, which was established in Lagos in 1892) and 
the Bank of British West Africa, Ltd (BBWA).16 These banks had 
‘special arrangements’ which amounted to an exclusive 
contract with the imperial government to supply currency to 
the colonies.17 Britain paid for freight and other miscellaneous 
expenses for supplying silver coins to the colonies, ‘in return 
for prepayment in the United Kingdom of its nominal value’.18 
After the ABC ceased operations in 1893, the BBWA, which had 
opened up in Lagos in 1894, took over these functions from the 
former by securing an exclusive agreement with the Lagos 
government on 4 May 1894. The BBWA subsequently set up 
operations for the supply of British coins in the Gold Coast and 
the other British West African colonies; it had one branch in the 
Gambia, two in Sierra Leone, eight in the Gold Coast, five in 
Southern Nigeria, and one branch in Northern Nigeria.19 
Therefore, Britain effectively privatized the importation and 
repatriation of silver coins in the colonies by contracting it out 
to big banking interests. These Banks operated by charging 
merchants and traders a 1% premium for supplying them with 
British coinage. However, merchants, traders and other 
stakeholders in the colonies had contested the preferential 
treatment afforded the ABC and demanded a more egalitarian 
system. Merchants complained of the Bank’s monopoly of the 
currency supply, the 1% premium that they had to pay for 
coinage and that other banks in the colonies were ‘prejudiced 
by these arrangements’.20 This contestation would bring about 
the cancellation of the contract that the ABC (and later the 
BBWA) had with the government and usher in a new monetary 
regime under the auspices of the WACB in 1912.21 
It is clear from the foregoing reports of squabbling between 
the British colonial officials and the expatriate merchants, and 
the jostling for power and influence between the latter 
themselves, that the monetary and banking debates and the 
reforms enacted during this period took place above the heads 
of the local African populations. Helleiner’s argument, that the 
cash-poor in the colonies were only important in terms of the 
need to incorporate them into the cash economy as taxpayers 
and not as important decision makers and stakeholders in the 
new monetary order, is therefore a plausible one. Moreover, the 
colonial banks, businesses and officials were also insensitive to 
the monetary needs of African entrepreneurs, often asserting 
that Africans were not credit-worthy. The British banks 
(namely Barclays Bank (DCO) and BBWA) operating in the 
colony catered mainly to the government, expatriate and non-
African interests, and failed to extend adequate credit (or any 
at all, in some cases) to Gold Coasters.22 Moreover, as Uche 
explains, the colonial authorities had outlawed locally 
chartered banks in 1906, which removed a valuable source of 
credit for Africans and essentially paved the way for the 
establishment of the colonial common currency system.23
Another major factor, which the WACC pointed out in its 
Report in support of monetary change, was the increasing 
demand for British currency in the colonies, particularly in 
British West Africa. It noted that there was ‘a direct inducement 
to over-issue, because new silver has, in some places, a special 
value for the purposes of native trade’.24 From 1886–1911, British 
West Africa had had a significant increase in the circulation of 
British currency, at times surpassing the coin circulation in the 
British Isles itself (see Table 2). The Committee speculated 
that, the potential for British coins to return into circulation in 
London, was more likely during an economic depression, and 
the possibility that this could destabilize the imperial economy, 
made the issue of West Africa having its own independent 
currency more urgent. The Committee found that:
the continued issue of the silver coins of the United Kingdom to the 
West African Colonies is [in]compatible with the successful control 
of its token coinage by the Home Government without the 
introduction of radical changes into its financial system… the use 
of sterling silver in West Africa without limit of tender has now 
become so considerable as to contain elements of danger, which 
are intensified by the steady increase of the circulation, and which 
affect the interests both of the United Kingdom and of British West 
Africa.25
Ironically, the demand for British currency in West Africa 
was attributed to expanding merchant activities, greater 
colonial penetration and opening up of the territories, and the 
replacement of indigenous trading practices such as barter 
with modern British currency, which now jeopardized the 
metropolis, monetarily.26
The profitability of a new system of currency to the colonial 
governments and mercantile classes was also a significant 
factor in the establishment of the WACB regime. As the 
Committee put it: 
there will, of course, be a very large ‘profit’ representing the 
difference between the bullion and face value of [special] silver 
currency supplied to British West Africa. That country [sic] has 
absorbed over 6 ½ million pounds (face value) in silver coin during 
the past 26 years, and the absorption may be expected to continue, 
even if not at the same rate.27 
From Cowries to Coins
Table 2: Circulation of British sterling silver in the UK, West Africa & other territories
Period West Africa United Kingdom Other territories
Average for the period 1886–1890
   1891–1895 
    1896–1900 
    1901–1905 
    1906–1910 
   1911
  £
 24,426 
 116,323
 257,090
 262,786
 666,190
 874,850
 £
 920,088
 761,039
 796,425
 234,150
 781,073
 1,219,766
 £
 255,939
 124,461
 367,233
 231,504
 325,347
 286,575
Source: NA: CO 984/2, WACC Report, ‘Analysis of British sterling silver issued for circulation in West Africa in the United Kingdom and in other sterling-
using Territories’, 6.
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The Committee continued that the new currency ‘should be 
a source of considerable ultimate profit to the colonial 
governments concerned’.28 The admission that the issuance of a 
special colonial currency would be a profit-making venture 
within itself undermines the previous assertions that it was just 
fear that the continued circulation of British coinage in Africa 
posed a direct risk to the home government. Profit, in addition 
to the risk of loss, therefore were the main driving forces 
behind the establishment of the WACB. Therefore, colonial 
officials and British merchants in West Africa worked together to 
advance their own interests, which overlapped for the most part. 
While officials in London and their colonial counterparts in West 
Africa sought to protect the political and monetary interests of 
the home government, expatriate merchants worked to protect 
their commercial interests and profit-base. The latter lobbied 
heavily for a new monetary system in the colonies mainly 
because it represented direct control of the machinery of money 
making to augment their coffers.
After outlining all the factors affecting the currency 
situation in the territories, the WACC concluded that: 
the introduction of a distinctive silver currency… is therefore… 
the only practicable measure that we are in a position to suggest for 
removing the defects of the present monetary conditions of West 
Africa.29
This recommendation resulted in the creation of the West 
African Currency Board in 1912 and the establishment of a 
common colonial currency for Britain’s five possessions in the 
sub-region. For a small service charge, the WACB coins and 
banknotes were made convertible into British sterling when 
presented at any of the currency centres in Accra, Bathurst, 
Freetown or Lagos. The equivalent amount in pound sterling 
would be paid into the customer’s account in London.30 The 
establishment of this colonial currency system in 1912 signalled 
the emergence of a new era in West African history. Whereas 
the pre-1912 period was characterized by the political 
consolidation of the colonial state at the expense of the vast 
majority of the peoples, the post-1912 era proved to be a major 
monetary victory for Britain. However, this monetary 
advancement would be tempered by several challenges, most 
notably the resilience of traditional currencies and the coming 
of a World War two years later. 
Colonial currency designs
The WACB authorities confronted several challenges to their 
new monopoly on money. Firstly, they had the daunting task of 
making the new currency popular with and acceptable to 
Africans. In this regard, the WACC Report had highlighted ‘the 
importance of not giving the natives any ground for 
discriminating between the new coins and those with which 
they have been familiar in the past’.31 The Committee found 
that:
the native is suspicious of change, and that it might take a long time 
to overcome any prejudice on his part against the new silver… if 
the new coins bear the King’s head on the obverse and are of the 
customary denomination, size, and weight, very little difficulty 
need be anticipated on this score. When it is remembered that the 
coins now in common circulation in West Africa include five 
florins, five shillings, and five sixpences bearing five different 
effigies of three different monarchs on the obverse… the 
justification for this view becomes obvious.32
As Cusack has argued with respect to stamp designs, the 
empire was ‘to be represented by the alternating heads of Kings 
and Queens’.33 Therefore, minting the head of King George IV 
on the WACB coinage was not only meant to ensure consistency 
with previous designs, but also to symbolize the absolute, 
centralizing power around which the colonized territories and 
peoples would be consolidated. Similarly, Mwangi has found 
that, in the case of the East African Currency Board (EACB), 
the colonial authorities were adamant about keeping the coin 
and note designs consistent (by minting the effigy of the 
reigning British Monarch on the face of EACB coinage) so as to 
maintain public confidence in the money’s value.34 In addition 
to the British sovereign’s head, the other prominent image of 
the WACB coinage was of the geographical terrain mostly in 
the form of a palm tree (see Fig. 3). These images subtly 
reinforced the monarch’s lordship over the people and colonial 
landscape; there were no images of Africans. It was only after 
the 1948 Accra Riots, which resulted in greater agitations by 
nationalists for political and monetary independence, that the 
WACB began to include imagery of Africans on their 
banknotes. Nonetheless, the natives were mainly portrayed as 
happily engaged in export-designated cash-crop (groundnuts, 
cocoa and palm oil) production, reinforcing notions of colonial 
hegemony and the civilizing mission.35 There are several 
assumptions that the WACB made about the nature of ‘natives’ 
that warrant analysis. Describing them as being ‘suspicious of 
change’ and therefore needing some convincing signals, a 
certain colonial mindset that Africans (perhaps unlike 
Europeans) were resistant to change, that is, traditional and 
averse to modernity. Secondly, the Committee overestimated 
the familiarity and popularity of colonial coinage among 
locals. While the circulation of British currency increased over 
time, the majority of peasants would not have frequently used, 
or had access to, this currency. Moreover, the use of cowrie, 
gold dust and other forms of traditional currencies showed a 
resilience to being eradicated that undermined the rapidity 
with which the colonial administration wanted its coinage to 
circulate.
Coins, paper money and World War I
As the previous section demonstrated, the ‘native question’ was 
always one of the principal considerations and challenges for 
the success of the new monetary regime. On the issue of the 
Africans’ acceptance of the new coinage, the Committee had 
been quite confident; ‘There is little reason to doubt that coins 
of the proposed new currency would be well received by the 
native population, if certain precautions were taken’.36 
Unfortunately, the new coinage issued in 1913 went into 
circulation just before the beginning of the First World War. 
During WWI, the WACB and the Clifford colonial government 
Figure 3 1-shilling coin 1916 (palm tree, King George V) 
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the locals’ resistance to paper money.42 
Given the special circumstances and hardships of the War, 
why were ordinary Africans so picky about paper? As 
Wrangham shows, there were practical and cultural causes for 
their resoluteness.43 The tropical climate made paper easy to 
deteriorate, susceptible to fire and to consummation by white 
ants. Furthermore, the typical ‘pocketless’ cloth attire of the 
native population made it hard to carry around paper money; it 
was easier for them to tie their silver coins into knots on their 
cloth.44 Despite these problems, the WACB decided to introduce 
non-legal tender paper currency in late 1916, but this was met 
with unsubstantiated success.45 However, by the end of the war, 
a combination of the shortage and high price of silver and 
nickel-bronze currency forced the Clifford government to 
confer legal tender status on the WACB banknotes (Figs 4, 5). 
Notwithstanding, the WACB banknotes were met with 
resistance. For example, some market places from the Northern 
Territories to the Coast, and even some workers in the formal 
sectors refused to accept paper currency as payment since 
many did not regard it as real money. Some farmers, for 
instance, preferred to sell their cocoa on credit than accept 
paper money. Ashanti Goldfields mine-workers in Obuasi were 
initially paid only 15% of their salary in banknotes after the 
introduction of bills, and some workers for the West African 
Rubber Plantations company were adamant about not being 
paid in paper.46 Given the currency shortages during World War 
I, the use of barter and cowry shells still continued, especially 
in the Northern Territories, Eastern Province, Ashanti and 
other rural zones.47 Moreover, in the post-1918 period, paper 
money continued to be unpopular with the locals. In some 
cases, if paper money were accepted for transactions, its value 
would be discounted.48 However, in September 1920 the 
Figure 5 1-shilling banknote 1918 (with image of 1 shilling coin)
faced even more difficulties in currency administration in the 
Gold Coast. Silver was scarce worldwide, creating a shortage of 
silver coinage, which severely affected trade of farm produce, 
cocoa, mining and other essential commodities. The shortage 
of coinage was also created by the high expense of sending the 
Gold Coast Regiment expedition to fight on Britain’s behalf in 
East Africa.37 However, silver shortage wasn’t the only problem. 
The nickel-bronze coinage introduced by the WACB in 1912 
were being used in the marketplace for everything from 
making small change to ornaments, gambling counters and 
washers for galvanized iron roofing. The hole in the nickel-
bronze coins also made them usable as jewellery.38 The 
shortage of currency was further complicated by London’s 
inability to supply the colonies with adequate coinage on the 
one hand. On the other, locals also tended to melt down coins 
for jewellery-making, hoard coins and were reluctant to put 
their money in the banks. Fluctuating cocoa prices also put 
further strains on the limited supply of coinage in the Gold 
Coast. Furthermore, London officials remained indifferent to 
the locals’ disdain for, and culturally related reluctance to use, 
paper money.39
If convincing the locals that the coins issued by the WACB 
after 1912 were just as good as the previous British coins in 
circulation, then the issuance of paper money was even more 
difficult, especially during World War I. Coin or metallic money 
had intrinsic value and therefore was thought to be more 
‘tangible’ than banknotes, which depended on ‘real’ money 
(gold or silver) to guarantee its value. The Committee duly 
recognized this challenge. ‘It is clear that the success of a note 
[paper money] issue in British West Africa must depend on the 
willingness of an appreciable part of the native population to 
use this form of currency, which is at present unknown to 
them’.40 But how would the WACB try to ensure this loyalty and 
‘willingness’ of the native population to use the new form of 
currency? There was always the option to use force, but the 
Committee discounted the suggestions by some witnesses to 
resort to force, as ‘the prospect of ultimate success would be 
prejudiced if at any early stage notes were forced on natives 
who preferred coin’.41 Given these challenges, Governor 
Clifford found himself in a diplomatic dilemma. On the one 
hand, he tried to pressure the WACB and the Colonial Office to 
supply more silver coinage and hold back on issuing paper 
money too soon in the Gold Coast. On the other, he tried to 
temper the wartime instability and anxieties in the colony and 
implored the native population to have more confidence in 
paper money. The Governor even initially rejected London’s 
advice to issue paper currency to ease the coin shortage, given 
From Cowries to Coins
Figure 4 5-pound banknote 1954 (palm trees, river, natives harvesting palm nuts)
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introduction of a new mixed-metal coinage contributed to a 
more stable currency environment, coinciding with the 
fluctuations of the post-war economy.49 Consequently, the 
British colonial authorities formulated a massive marketing 
campaign to ensure the success of the new currency both 
within as much as outside of their colonial borders.
Conclusion
The coming of coinage to British West Africa in the first quarter 
of the 20th century, was occasioned by several coinciding 
factors. There were economic considerations, including: the 
reduction of monetary transaction costs, between Britain and 
its colonies and within its colonies; better macro-economic 
management, and the extraction of seigniorage profits by the 
colonial governments.50 These reasons were especially fuelled 
by the increasing circulation of British currency in West Africa 
and the fear that unfavourable economic conditions there 
would cause the repatriation of coins to Britain, which could 
destabilize the home economy.51 Hopkins also rightly claims 
that the WACB was established ‘to settle expatriate commercial 
rivalries in West Africa’, among the banking, shipping and 
other trading interests competing for the spoils of the 
‘Scramble for Africa’.52 London officials and their 
administrators in the colonies, on the one hand, sought to 
protect the monetary system of the home government from the 
negative effects of oversupply of British currency in the 
colonies. On the other hand, colonial administrators on the 
ground and their expatriate commercial allies viewed the 
establishment of a colonial currency system as a way to make a 
profit from seigniorage.
Ideological and politically, monetization represented the 
last two projects of what missionary and explorer David 
Livingstone identified as the three C’s of British imperialism in 
Africa, namely, Christianity, Civilization and Commerce. 
Colonial authorities demonetized a variety of local monies 
(manillas, cowry shells, gold dust, etc.) and foreign colonial 
currencies (French, American, Latin Union, etc.) that 
circulated concurrently with the pound sterling. Colonial 
money was thought to be superior to African currency, and the 
incorporation of Africans into the world of taxation and waged 
labour was vital to the success of the colonial machinery.53 
Moreover, the images of the reigning British monarchs and the 
territorial landscape that were minted on colonial coinage and 
paper money were symbolic of Great Britain’s lordship over the 
colonized.
The convergence of British colonialism and the WACB’s 
monopolization of currency in the Gold Coast in 1912 signalled 
the loss of political and monetary sovereignty for the 
indigenous population. The demonetization of pre-colonial 
currencies
produced significant losses for Africans, especially those who held 
much of their fortune in these forms of money. Without a formal 
monetary role, cowry shells could only now be sold for their lime 
content at very low values.54 
It also forced Africans into colonial enterprises such as the 
production of cash crops, much of the proceeds of which went 
into paying taxes and other expenses that were only accepted 
in colonial currency. 
Notwithstanding this loss of politico-monetary autonomy, 
Gold Coasters, through passive and active strategies resisted 
the colonial monetary regime throughout the entire period. 
These subversive measures included the continued use of 
indigenous and foreign currencies, counterfeiting colonial 
coins and banknotes,55 defacing currency, melting down money 
to make jewellery, and refusing to use bank notes. According to 
Mwangi,
through the medium of conflicting currencies… the Africans… 
without resorting to heroic political action, defied and resisted 
through their daily lives the ambitions of the [colonial] state.56
Political action came in 1957 when Ghana achieved 
independence from Britian. As I argue in another article, Prime 
Minister Kwame Nkrumah sought to establish Ghana’s status as 
an independent nation-state by breaking from the WACB 
colonial common currency and establishing the Ghana pound 
in 1958 and cedi and pesewa currency in 1965 – embellished 
with nationalistic symbols and iconography.57
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